Since its democratic transition in the early nineties, Hungary has developed a foreign policy strategy,
INTRODUCTION
On 4 October 2018, Ukraine decided to expel the Hungarian consul of Berehove, a city located in the Zakarpattia Oblast, Western Ukraine. A few hours later, the Hungarian government retaliated, expelling a Ukrainian diplomat.1 This diplomatic incident represented the peak of tensions initially triggered by a law passed in Ukraine in 2017. This law, known as the education law, aims at reinforcing the teaching of Ukrainian language in the schools of the country, to the detriment of the numerous minority languages of Ukraine, including Hungarian. The news had been coldly received by the Hungarian government, which, repeating its commitment to the protection of the rights of the Hungarian minorities abroad, started using all the tools at its disposal to pressure the Ukrainian government to remove the law. After a series of twists which Hungarian minority, contravening the Ukrainian law, which forbids dual citizenship -ultimately leading to the aforementioned diplomatic crisis.
The situation may seem odd to those unaware of the existence of Hungarian minorities beyond the Hungarian state, nor of the Hungarian foreign policy strategy since the 1990s towards these minorities. This foreign policy strategy, henceforth called 'Hungarian nation policy', has triggered numerous tensions with Hungary's neighbours over the last thirty years, as illustrated by the Ukrainian case. Yet, it also paradoxically inspired cooperation and led to developments in the Central European region.
I will seek here to set out and analyse the implications of the Hungarian nation policy in Central Europe, encompassing Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine and Romania. I will first give a brief historical account of the Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian basin, and present an overview of the Hungarian nation policy since the democratic transition in the early nineties.
Then, I will argue that the Hungarian nation policy has in fact had contradictory outcomes in Central Europe, sometimes leading to confrontation with Hungary's neighbours, while at other times instigating dialogue, integration and development. Eventually, I will call upon critical perspectives, highlighting the challenges and limits of this governmental strategy.
THE HUNGARIAN NATION POLICY (NEMZETPOLITIKA): ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENTS
In a foreign policy document dating back to 1921, a Hungarian diplomat declared that: The treaty came as a diktat for the newly born Hungarian state. Hungary had lost the war and foreign powers had decided of its fate without consulting it. Worst, the new geographical division of Europe had also led to the division of the Hungarian nation. Nourishing hopes of reunification, the Hungarian government decided to side with Nazi Germany during the Second World War, which lead to another defeat.5
During the socialist era , while Trianon was arguably enduring in the Hungarian collective memory, nationalist claims were played down at the state level in the name of the 'communist brotherhood'. However, from the late seventies, and following the anti-Hungarian repression orchestrated by Ceausescu's Romania, the Hungarian government gradually beganto express concern about the fate of its kin-nationals again.6 As Pogonyi points out, the sensitivity of the topic amongst the Hungarian population allowed the political opposition to use it in order to contest the Communist rule.7
In 1989, the Hungarian Constitution was amended to include a reference to the Hungarian receiving a large flow of immigrants would require increased expenditure on welfare services.
The Hungarian government also believes that the historical lands of Hungary must remain populated with Hungarians.34 As a consequence, the Hungarian power has had to find a way to balance this dual objective: improving its kin-minorities' life standards, while making sure that they will not settle back in Hungary. One strategy that has been developed is the promotion of foreign policy and economy, in this sense, could not be stronger'. occurred, Szijjártó used these economic investments as a bargaining tool to obtain guarantees that the situation would be resolved.40
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
After reviewing the implications of the Hungarian nation policy for Central Europe, I would now like to call upon critical perspectives on the concept. First, while the Hungarian nation policy is undoubtedly a big part of the foreign policy strategy of Hungary, the relations it sustains with its neighbours cannot be reduced to this aspect. Indeed, the country needs partners to really be influential on the European or international stages. As such, the development of the Visegrád cooperation (V4) addresses the geopolitical weaknesses of the region. This partnership with
Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic has proved to be very successful in providing a counter power to Western European countries, notably during the refugee crisis. However, for the alliance to be efficient, Hungary had and will have to put aside its disagreements with Slovakia. contributed to cordial relations'.42 This analysis illustrates that conflicts over kin-nationals are also intertwined with more pragmatic political considerations and alliances. Subsequently, Hungary's ardours with regard to its kin-nationals are likely to be tempered if it needs to join forces to address other important topics.
What is more, it is interesting to ask whether the 'minority argument' is not as well a potential political smokescreen to achieve other goals. Orbán has proved to be a pragmatic political leader and is currently sustaining a difficult balance, where he seeks to preserve allies in friendship with Vladimir Putin surely will not be looked upon favourably by Hungary's allies in NATO and the EU.44 As Hungary proved to be very reliant on its partners to secure the rights of its kin-minorities, how the government will proceed if it alienates these partners remains an unanswered question.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, I examined the Hungarian nation policy's implications in Central Europe.
In fact, the 'return to Europe' of Hungary in the early nineties was correlated with the (re)emergence of narratives asserting the indivisibility of the Hungarian nation. Since then, the different Hungarian governments have sought to defend not only the interests of the Hungarian citizens in Hungary but also of the ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia and Ukraine with the aim to preserve and defend Hungarian culture and language in the former Hungarian territories. This nation policy has led to numerous quarrels with the above-mentioned states and still occasionally threatens the equilibrium of the region. However, it has also had positive effects on the cohesion and the development of Central Europe, as Hungary believes that its kin-nationals are better off in a peaceful and democratic environment.
Interestingly, the government's concern for the Hungarian minorities abroad appears to fluctuate over time, seemingly depending on (geo)political circumstances. Especially since Fidesz's accession to power in 2010, the nation policy has increasingly been instrumentalised, or downplayed, to support other political interests that should perhaps not be overlooked. In this regard, future developments in the dispute between Hungary and Ukraine will surely be instructive. 
